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COUNSEL, CLIENTS AND COMMUNITY
By H. W. ARTmJS*
I
It has been suggested that "all professions seem to possess (1) sys-
tematic theory, (2) authority, (3) community sanction, (4) ethical codes,
and (5) a culture".1 Other definitions, of course, might equally be used for
discussion, but almost all of them would include the two elements I wish to
consider: the authority of members of the legal profession in relation to their
individual clients, and the community sanction of their corporate activities
and policies.2 In particular, I want to explore the effect upon these aspects of
legal professionalism of changes in Canadian society over the past twenty
or thirty years. Urbanization, immigration, mass literacy and mass com-
munications, heightened personal, political, economic and social self-aware-
ness and self-assertiveness are amongst the most obvious changes in the
social environment of the Canadian legal profession. Have they had any
significant effect upon the profession?
II
Professionals are said to possess "authority" in their relationships with
laymen. This authority is based on moral and intellectual claims.3 "Moral"
claims are rooted in the notion that professionals put service to their clients
above their personal convenience or financial gain. "Intellectual" claims, on
the other hand, are those arising from the skills and knowledge which pro-
fessionals possess and laymen do not. Of course, in practice both moral and
intellectual claims sometimes prove to be unwarranted: some lawyers are
self-seeking, some are incompetent. But there is enough truth in both claims
to give them continuing validity in the minds of lawyers and clients alike.
They serve to secure respect and authority for lawyers from their clients.
Respect and authority, in turn, are translated into specific beliefs which
have traditionally been held by lawyers. Lawyers believe, for example, that
they have the right to look "objectively" at matters in which others are emo-
* Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. (Earlier versions of this
paper were delivered at the Department of Law, Carleton University, and the Faculty
of Law, University of Western Ontario).
1 Greenwood, "'The Elements of Professionalization", reprinted in Vollmer and
Mills (eds.), Professionalization (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966) at 10.
21 have elsewhere discussed the "systematic theory" point. See "Progress and Pro-
fessionalism: The Canadian Legal Profession in Transition" in Ziegel (ed.), Law and
Social Change (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1973).
3 Cf. Hughes, Men and Their Work (Chicago: Free Press, 1958) c.6.
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tionally involved, 4 the right to make decisions for a client,5 the right to
evaluate the correctness or appropriateness of the work of colleagues.0 Yet
each of these traditional manifestations of authority is giving way - or at
least being challenged and redefined.
Consider the right to look "objectively" at matters in which others are
emotionally involved. This notion of a professional's detachment is so deeply
rooted that, in common parlance, to be "professional" about something is
to stand back and look at it dispassionately. The courtroom lawyer sub-
scribes (at least in theory) to the proposition that he is an "officer of the
court", that he must not knowingly mislead the court, and that he must not
express his personal belief in the guilt or innocence of his client. Although
the lawyer is the paid partisan of one of the parties, he nonetheless should
share the judge's commitment to objective decision-making. In our humour,
we jokingly note that "the lawyer who acts for himself has a fool for a
client" - presumably because he cannot be objective about himself. All of
these things contribute to the myth of the lawyer's objectivity, and hence, to
his "authority".
Yet today, the objectivity of lawyers, far from being universally re-
spected, is seriously attacked both within and without the profession.
The attack from the public is not hard to understand:
In time of crisis, detachment appears the most perilous deviation of all, the one
least to be tolerated. The professional mind, in such a case, appears as a per-
version of the common sense of what is urgent and what is less urgent. The
license to think in longer perspective thus may appear dangerous. 7
This observation is well illustrated by public hostility to lawyers (and others)
who criticized the government's handling of the F.L.Q. crisis because they
believed that civil liberties were unjustifiably invaded.
But an attack by lawyers themselves on objectivity as a desideratum
is more surprising. Objectivity, indeed, is enshrined in the Canons of Ethics,
and buttressed by traditional rules against champerty and maintenance. This
is not to suggest that lawyers have always been objective in fact. Sometimes,
in the past, "objectivity" was achieved because lawyer and client happened
to share beliefs and values as part of that group of "right thinking men" who
constituted the ruling elite within the community. Growing awareness of this
spurious claim to objectivity evoked the scornful reproach that such lawyers
were merely "hired guns" for the establishment. They were admonished to
41,... [The lawyer] should bear in mind that seldom are all the law and facts on
the side of his client and that 'audi alteram partem' is a safe rule to follow". Canadian
Bar Association, Canons of Ethics, Canon 3(1) (Adopted September, 1920) in L.S.U.C.,
Professional Conduct Handbook (1971) at 5.
5 This is often couched in terms of presenting the client with the alternative of
either following "advice" or terminating the relationship, see e.g. Martin, "Problems of
Ethics and Advocacy" in Defending a Criminal Case, [1969] L.S.U.C. Spec. Lect. 279.
6 See generally Orkin, Professional Autonomy and the Public Interest: A Study of
the Law Society of Upper Canada (D. Jur. thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University, 1971).
7 Hughes, supra, note 3 at 84.
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assert their professional independence, to disassociate themselves from clients
whose self-seeking, anti-social conduct they aided, abetted and often pro-
moted. In this context, radical social critics could appeal to the profession's
formal norms in order to indict the leaders of the bar.
Now, ironically, those same critics disparage objectivity and advocate
close identification with the client as a positive virtue. Today, it is not
primarily the establishment lawyer who identifies closely with his client; it is,
first and foremost, the lawyer for the underdog.
"Committed advocacy" is, to be sure, not the invention of the con-
temporary civil rights or poverty lawyers. Clarence Darrow was a practi-
tioner, par excellence, of this style of lawyering over 50 years ago. But it is
only now that we are beginning to get some articulation of why detachment
and objectivity are to be shunned in favour of "commitment". 8
First, there is the fact, already alluded to, that "objectivity" sometimes
has been a euphemism for unthinking adherence to the status quo. Unfor-
tunately, in much the same way, "commitment" may become a code-name
for insurgency.
A more sophisticated argument rests on the premise that trust is an
essential element in a lawyer-client relationship. Trust, it is urged, can only
develop if the client is convinced that the lawyer is genuinely "committed"
to his interests. Given the profession's historic failure to serve the poor, and
the mistrust by all those outside the power elite of those associated with it,
special dramatic proofs of commitment are needed. These proofs include the
lawyer's overt acceptance of the client's values for his own: traditional forms
of dress and address are symbolically replaced by modem clothes and ver-
nacular speech; traditional arm's-length lawyer-client relationships are re-
placed by a commitment to common long-term goals; and from common
goals, it is only a short step to common participation in methods of achieving
them. The client's cause becomes the touch-stone of his lawyer's conduct.
A third explanation of "committed advocacy" is much simpler, and
perhaps more plausible. In the 1960's, Canadian universities, like those all
over the world, were populated by a generation of young people whose
idealism and political consciousness was much greater than their predeces-
sors'. Since they were members of the university community, it was inevitable
that law students would come to share many of these attitudes. Likewise, it
was inevitable that attitudes acquired at university should to a greater or
lesser extent, survive into post-graduation professional activity. Thus, the
new "committed advocates" are simply giving priority to the concerns which
are foremost in their life.
The question that remains to be answered is whether, as lawyers, they
are more likely to abandon such concerns in favour of traditional professional
norms than they were, as students, to abandon them in favour of other com-
8 See e.g. Black (ed.), Radical Lawyers - Their Role in the Movement and in the
Courts (New York: Avon Books, 1971).
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peting values. In part, the answer to this question will depend upon external
considerations: the general political climate, the continued existence of a
constituency of radical clients, the availability of at least minimal financial
support for new forms of legal practice. In part, the question will be answered
within the legal profession itself. Whether it chooses to tolerate, rather than
suppress, committed advocacy will obviously be significant.
What will be the reaction of the profession? No doubt, to some lawyers
the conduct of these young people will be anathema; they will seek to make
them conform or to drive them out of the profession. However, such bloody-
mindedness will probably be the exception rather than the rule. I expect that
what will gradually emerge is not mere tolerance for the different approach
of this new breed of lawyers, but as well a growing recognition that lawyers
must relate to their clients on an empathetic and compassionate basis, that
they must modify their styles of practice at least to the extent of sloughing
off needless formalism and false mannerisms. Perhaps even more significant
in the long run, will be the increasing commitment of more lawyers to the
eradication of the injustices which initially gave rise to discontent.
I hasten to add, however, that this prediction assumes that ways will
be found to translate these new attitudes into useful and rewarding profes-
sional roles. Unless there is some development of new career possibilities for
these young lawyers, many of them will have to revert to traditional types of
legal work for a more conventional clientele. This would leave them cynical
and embittered, and would leave society the poorer for being deprived of
their talents and idealism. Whatever their future, it is clear that the Canadian
bar presently contains a small but articulate and intelligent cadre of young
lawyers whose relationships with courts, clients and colleagues does not con-
form to traditional patterns. 9
I turn next to the proposition that a lawyer has the authority to make
decisions for his client and its corollary that the client's refusal to accept a
decision will result in termination of the relationship. A classic illustration of
this arises in the context of the criminal trial. One of Canada's foremost
criminal lawyers has said,
I don't think any client has the right to compel a lawyer to act contrary to his
best professional judgment .... [1f] the accused insisted on giving evidence con-
trary to my advice, I would ask the trial judge for permission to withdraw and to
declare a mistrial, simply on the ground that I had lost the confidence of my
client, and I was no longer able to follow his instructions .... I must say that in
more than 30 years of practice I have never had this occur .... 10
The lawyer's assertion of authority, and the lack of challenge thereto by the
client, are both eloquently evidenced by this statement.
However, there has developed a small - but significant - body of
opinion which assigns the dominant role in the lawyer-client relationship to
the client, rather than the lawyer. This position is usually taken in the con-
text of a discussion relating to the representation of those who have never
0 Robins, Our Profession and the Winds of Change (1972), 6 L.S.U.C. Gaz. 137.
10 Martin, supra, note 5 at 284 passim.
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enjoyed either power or professional services in the past. An example of such
a group might well be tenants in a public housing project involved in a rent
strike, or some similar concerted activity, to win what they conceive to be
legitimate objectives. A lawyer acting for such a group would pretty clearly
have to tell them that under present laws, their chances of winning any
litigation to vindicate their position were negligible. Yet suppose, despite his
advice, that they insisted upon litigating. The lawyer, so it is argued, should
nonetheless act for them. To fail to do so would be to deprive the group of
their chosen means of self-assertion and would in effect simply be assisting
the opposition. The lawyer who persuades his clients to accept an unfavour-
able settlement is, in effect, securing their subjugation. By doing so, he
further alienates such groups and reinforces their conviction that lawyers are
allies of the powerful-and the natural enemies of the weak. In sum, the argu-
ment runs, to win trust we must yield authority."
One would have thought that this increased deference towards the
client's right of self-determination could have been supported on the tradi-
tional ground that it is the lawyer's function to represent, not judge, his
client. Yet it is that very position which tends to excite the anger of those
who are discontented with the conservative role of the profession as apologists
for "polluters", "exploiters" and other similarly unpleasant designations of
its corporate clientele. If in Canada we have not yet reached a situation (as
in the United States) where Wall Street law firms were boycotted by job-
seeking graduates, because of their representation of reactionary foreign gov-
ernments, or war industries, we nonetheless are beginning to see some fine
young lawyers quietly turning away from modes of practice which demand
that the lawyer share the moral burden of his anti-social clients. If it is im-
possible to divest lawyers of this burden, then the only solution is to avoid
putting oneself in the position where the burden must be assumed.
I turn to a final example. A lawyer's "authority" vis-A-vis laymen in-
cludes the right to judge his own work and the work of his colleagues, rather
than submit them to lay evaluation. This, perhaps, is inevitable since so much
of a lawyer's work is technical, and so much rests upon tacit understandings,
that judgments can only be made by those with an educated intuition - fel-
low professionals.
This is not to suggest that the layman is, in fact, without recourse
against his lawyer. He can lay a criminal charge if he has been defrauded.
He can sue civilly, for breach of trust12 or malpractice.18 He can have his bill
taxed if he feels he has been overcharged. At the same time, it must be said
that these remedies each has certain defects. A conviction for fraud does
not result in any practical gain for the victim. A civil suit is expensive, in-
volves problematic issues of proof and of doctrine, and may be worthless if
the lawyer does not have sufficient funds to pay a judgment. While recently
11 Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People (1970), 79 Yale LJ. 1049 at 1059 ff.
12 McSweeney v. Wallace (1870), 8 N.S.R. 83.
13 Bastedo, A Note on Lawyers' Malpractice: Legal Boundaries and Judicial Regula-
tions (1970), 7 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 311.
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the taxing master has shown considerable willingness to scrutinize profes-
sional billings,14 his very existence must be unknown to most clients. To an
extent, these defects are overcome by two schemes mounted by the profession
- a compensation fund for victims of fraud, 15 and compulsory insurance
against negligent malpractice.16 And finally, of course, the profession does
discipline its own. Disbarment for fraud or breach of trust is virtually auto-
matic,' 7 although negligent malpractice and overcharging have not as yet
been widely recognized as grounds for professional discipline.' s
What seems inescapable is that any forum selected by the layman will
be controlled by law-trained professionals: the criminal and civil courts, the
taxing master, the profession's disciplinary bodies. Any possibility of meaning-
ful lay participation is foreclosed: civil juries are unavailable in cases of pro-
fessional malpractice, 9 lay representatives on professional governing bodies
are expressly foreclosed from disciplinary proceedings, 20 even an appeal from
the profession's disciplinary bodies to the courts is denied to the lay com-
plainant, although it is available to the accused lawyer,2' and payment from
the profession's compensation fund is merely ex gratia, rather than an en-
forceable right of the lay victim. 22
The total control by the bar of the machinery of judgment is not to
be construed as a sinister conspiracy to protect its prerogatives or to suppress
criticism. Rather, it evidences the intensity of the honest conviction that only
those who know can judge.
So long as lawyers acted within areas of technical competence peculiar
to themselves, this was perhaps inevitable. But now, increasingly, lawyers
are offering their clients advice not simply about their legal rights, but also
about their personal problems, their business affairs, their civic respon-
sibilities, and a host of other similar matters in which (at best) the lawyer
is no more competent than a marriage counsellor, an accountant, a journalist,
or the client himself. Is it not inevitable, then, that there should be consider-
able scepticism about the immunity of the professional from lay judgment?
And if they have no other forum in which to translate scepticism into sanc-
'4 See e.g. Re Solicitors, [1972] 3 O.R. 433 (Taxing Officer); Re Solicitors, [1970]
1 O.R. 407 (Taxing Officer).
16 See Orkin, supra, note 6, part IV.
10 Martin, The Treasurer Reports (1971), 5 L.S.U.C. Gaz. 1 at 18.
17 S. Arthurs, Discipline in the Legal Profession in Ontario (1970), 7 Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 235.
18 Id., but cf. Re Prescott (1972), 19 D.L.R. (3d) 446 (B.C.C.A.).
19 See e.g. Smith v. Rae (1919), 51 D.L.R. 323 (Ont. C.A.); Town v. Archer
(1902), 4 O.L.R. 383; Sweetman v. Law (1923), 23 O.W.N. 502.
20 Statement of S.L. Robins, Q.C. to the Law Society Council on the appointment
of lay representatives to the benchers of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Dec.
1972, unreported).
21 Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.44; my own contrary reading of the
statute would appear to be in error, see Arthurs, Authority, Accountability and Democ-
racy in the Ontario Legal Profession (1971), 49 Can. Bar Rev. 1 at 6-7.
22See e.g. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.51(5).
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tions, will not laymen turn to the marketplace? The client who feels he can
get better advice elsewhere will take his work elsewhere, or make his own
decisions. This possibility, in turn, makes more pressing the problem of
whether the lawyer or the client is to have the last word in the case, and
whether the client is to somehow judge or evaluate his lawyer's conduct.
I have been emphasizing the challenge to the traditional assertion of a
lawyer's authority vis-a-vis his client. It would also be interesting to explore
certain dangers we have come to perceive when the client becomes too sub-
missive rather than too assertive, within the relationship. This may happen
in situations where the client is particularly passive or inarticulate, or in-
competent, or where the lawyer is particularly assertive, insightful or helpful.
Sometimes the client becomes totally dependent upon the lawyer, and this de-
pendency may tempt the lawyer to exploit the relationship for illicit purposes.
Of course, we have always recognized this danger insofar as it relates
to the financial exploitation of the client by his lawyer. Consequently, we
have rules forbidding the lawyer to act in situations in which there is a con-
flict of intdrest,23 and requiring him to observe the highest standards of trust
in the handling of his client's property. 24 New circumstances, however, have
provided us with new and more subtle temptations.
What of the lawyer on an "ego trip" who exploits his client for psy-
chological rather than financial gain? How many times must lawyers be
tempted to "play God" with their clients, to advise them omnisciently, but
without a proper basis of fact or competence in a particular field of personal
relationships or business policy?25 How often will lawyers use clients' law
suits as a convenient vehicle for expressing their own aggressive tendencies,
pursuing a private vendetta against another lawyer, or riding a particular
legal hobby horse?26 How often will lawyers, especially the most competent,
become committed to a high level of technical excellence whose costs, in a
particular situation, may well be excessive in relation to the gains to be made
on behalf of the client?
I return to my starting point. Clients today tend to be better educated
and informed or, at least, more self-assertive. There seems to have emerged
a current of agnosticism about professional authority. My sense of the situa-
tion is that if the legal profession wishes to continue to assert its authority,
and to reap its benefits in terms of income and prestige, it will have to find
a new and sounder basis for its claims.2 7
2 Canadian Bar Association, Canons of Ethics, supra, note 4, Canon 3(2), and
L.S.U.C., Professional Conduct Handbook, Rulings 2, 13, 14 and 15.
2 4 R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 556, s.17 et seq.
25 A distinguished law professor reports that, while in practise, he and his partner
devised a motto for their firm: "We know everything, we can do anything, we stop at
nothing". See Willis, What I Like and What I Don't Like About Lawyers (1970), 4
L.S.U.C. Gaz. 52 at 55.
26See e.g. Re Duncan (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 616 (S.C.C.), Re Solicitor, [19711
1 O.R. 318 (Taxing Officer).2 7 Cf. Haug and Sussman, Professional Autonomy and the Revolt of the Client
(1969), 17 Social Problems 153.
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Perhaps such a basis cannot be persuasively articulated. Perhaps, on the
other hand, there are good functional considerations which justify the tradi-
tional view of lawyer-client relations. My point is simply that changes in the
environment have begun to set in motion either changes in the authority posi-
tion of lawyers or, at a minimum, changes in the official ideology of the legal
profession.
fIl
The other feature of the legal profession I wish to explore is the fact
that it is sanctioned by the community. This sanction involves several aspects:
a monopoly over certain kinds of work for the members of the profession;
control by the profession over the education, admission and discipline of its
members; and privileges for members of the profession not enjoyed by laymen.
How do each of these aspects fare in the current crisis of Canadian legal
professionalism?
In Canada, of course, lawyers alone enjoy the right to render legal serv-
ices for reward. 28 The apparent triteness of this observation, however, may
mask its deeper implications.
First, what are "legal services"? It is fairly clear that advocacy in the
superior courts comes within any definition of "legal services". 29 But what of
advocacy before administrative tribunals and inferior courts? What of settle-
ment negotiations preceding or following the commencement of a legal action?
The preparation of many documents such as leases, simple wills, or applica-
tions for corporate charters is usually a routine clerical task. Does it properly
fall within the monopoly sanctioned by the community? °
Second, is the decision that certain services are "legal" in effect a self-
fulfilling prophecy? Some services, such as conveyancing, have traditionally
been performed by lawyers in part because lawyers in times past invested
them with many technicalities which are not "functional" today. It is some-
times suggested that lawyers therefore have an interest in not reforming the
law and in not removing these non-functional qualities, so that there will be
a justifiable basis for the asserted claim of monopoly. While there may be
some truth in this suggestion, in all fairness it must also be said that there
are many reform-minded lawyers who are committed to removing such
anachronisms.
Third, does the bar's assertion of its sole right to render legal services
28 See e.g. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.50.
29 See, for a rather extreme illustration of this proposition Re Letros (1972), 26
D.L.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.), where the husband of a litigant was forbidden to argue
on her behalf.
80 See e.g. References Re Powers of Notaries Public (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 447
(B.C.C.A.); Lyttle, Unauthorized Practice and Real Estate Transactions (1969), 3
L.S.U.C. Gaz. 104; Risk, The Records of Title to Land: A Plea for Reform (1971),
21 U. of T.LJ. 465 at 493 if.
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for gain extend to the rendering of such services gratuitously?31 If so, are
groups such as unions, cooperatives, churches, and ethnic associations, which
wish to provide legal assistance to their members, bound to conform to rules
of the legal profession which were designed to cover private practitioners?32
It can fairly be predicted that the scope of the profession's monopoly
will be a subject of hot debate in the years to come. Two forces seem to
be on a collision course. On the one side there is the bar, rapidly expanding
in size and seeking occupational "lebensraum" for its new members. On the
other side, there are many individuals and groups - some professional,
mostly lay, all militant - who are anxious to stimulate community self-help
through the use of "legal" weapons. These groups are reluctant to rely on
conventional legal representation because it is expensive, and incompatible
with their ideological commitment to self-help. They will surely try to dis-
regard the boundaries that the profession has staked out around its monopoly.
Precedent and current experience both suggest that some compromise
position will be reached.
Precedent can be found in the labour relations field. Labour unions, like
today's community groups, were often unable to afford legal representation,
and were always suspicious of it. When Ontario enacted Canada's first effec-
tive collective bargaining statute in 1943, its administration was entrusted to
a division of the High Court, before which only lawyers could appear.33 By
1944, federal warfare labour laws had displaced the provincial statute, and
an administrative board had displaced the court.34 Laymen and lawyers both
had the right to appear before the board. In 1948, a new federal statute was
introduced which sought to preclude the appearance of lawyers in concilia-
tion proceedings. This provision was withdrawn under pressure from the
bar,3-5 and the coexistence of laymen and lawyers continues in the labour
relations field to the present time.
Current experience likewise suggests that professionals and lay repre-
sentatives will both be permitted to represent community groups and their
31 The organized bar appears to concede that the official Legal Aid Plan does
not possess a monopoly over gratuitous legal services, see Report of the Subcommittee
on Community Legal Services (1972), L.S.U.C. at 112. However, this concession does
not warrant the conclusion that non-lawyers may render gratuitous legal services, see
Re Letros, supra, note 29.
32 See L.S.U.C. Professional Conduct Handbook, Ruling 3, para. 2(h), which
exempts from a general prohibition against "steering", briefs referred to a lawyer by "a
community social agency ... providing legal advice or service on a gratuitous basis for
persons falling within the scope of the agency's activities".
3 3 Collective Bargaining Act, Stat Ont. 1943, c.4; Judicature Act, Stat. Ont. 1943,
c.11, and see Laskin, Collective Bargaining in Ontario: A New Legislative Approach
(1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev. 684 at 689 ff.
34 Labour Relations Board Act, Stat. Ont. 1944, c.29, and Judicature Act, Stat.
Ont. 1944, c.27. (P.C. 1003, the federal wartime labour regulations, are found as an
appendix to Stat. Ont. 1944, c.29).
35 See Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, Bill 338, ultimately
enacted as Stat Can. 1948, c.54, and Midwinter Meeting of the Ontario Bar (1948),
26 Can. Bar Rev. 569.
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members. At one end of the spectrum, there are statutes such as the new
Quebec Small Claims Court Act which forbids the intervention of either
lawyers or non-legal representatives3 Here, in fact, the adversary process is
intended to be suspended in favour of informal, inquisitorial procedures so
that the poor, presumably, will not need either of the two competing groups.
At the other end of the spectrum, we are seeing the emergence of a small
group of qualified lawyers who are prepared to sacrifice both professional fees
and professional prerogatives in order to serve community groups at a cost
and in a manner they wish. By so doing, they obviate the need for a clear
definition of the limits of the profession's monopoly.
Between these two extremes, we find many areas of shared practice. The
summary conviction provisions of the Criminal Code, which are incorporated
by reference into many provincial statutes, provide that an accused person
may appear by agent or counsel.37 The Ontario small claims court legislation
has a similar provision. 8 Here, there is an important field of practice for
lay advocates. Other areas come to mind: in Quebec, "avocats populaires"
are assuming responsibility for a broad spectrum of counselling functions in
the area of welfare law; in Ontario, there is a modest proliferation of lay
advocates specializing in workmen's compensation and immigration matters.
Since 1971, lay practitioners before administrative agencies in Ontario have
operated under the protection of an "agent or counsel" provision, 9 but had,
in any event, been tolerated to the point where it would have been difficult
to suppress them.
In the final analysis, it is probably recognition of the political realities
which will prevent overreaching by either lay or professional groups. The
ultimate justification for any professional monopoly must be the protection
of the public against the potential harm of reliance on incompetent service
rendered by unregulated lay practitioners. Any attempt to foreclose lay com-
petition simply to protect the economic interests of lawyers must, and should,
ultimately fail.
Thus, in areas where the profession does not in fact render service, it
will probably not choose to, nor be permitted to, assert its monopoly. This
includes most of the advice-giving and negotiating jobs in the area of "poverty
law". In other areas, such as conveyancing, the problem is more complicated.
Although much of the actual work is done by clericals and para-professionals,
a lawyer supervises and retains ultimate responsibility for the end result. Since
the professional monopoly is rooted in antiquated substantive law relating to
land titles, its retrenchment necessarily involves fundamental reform of the
law. This has occurred already throughout much of Canada.
But unrestricted lay advocacy - for example, in superior court litigation
- is not in the cards. Here the public interest in assuring basic competence
36 Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Stat. Que. 1971, c.86, s.955.
3 7 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s.735(2); Summary Convictions Act, R.S.O.
1970, c.450, s. 3.
38 Small Claims Court Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.439, ss.91, 100
80 Statutory Powers Procedure Act, Stat. Ont. 1971, c.47, s.10.
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comes clearly to the fore. Here the profession would perceive a threat to its
very existence. I am not suggesting that the public would necessarily be
harmed greatly if lay experts were permitted to compete with lawyers in all
fields. This, in effect, is the situation in Sweden. However, I am suggesting
that at the core, where the tasks to be done potentially involve a high degree
of technical knowledge, lawyers are most likely to retain their monopoly.
One more question should be raised about the profession's monopoly.
Why did so many defendants in the FLQ trials refuse representation by
counsel in work which is classically identified with the profession: the defence
of persons charged with major criminal offences? At one level, it seems that
they must have made the calculation that there was more political capital to
be made if they appeared without counsel. However, at another level, this
calculation suggests that even the most sympathetic lawyers were regarded by
them as being unhelpful to the attainment of their political objectives. I sug-
gest that the legal profession, in their eyes, does not merely own a monopoly;
it is owned by its monopoly. Lawyers are perceived as the servants of the
system which is embodied in the laws which form the basis of their monopoly.
This simplistic and paranoid view of lawyers brushes aside the vast range of
attitudes and commitments within the profession. But in extreme form, it
does raise a problem which must be confronted: how are the powerless and
the poor to be assured sympathetic representation? Surely, the answer is that
the profession's monopoly must not be used to exact ideological conformity
from all of its members. Like all publicly sanctioned monopolies, it must be
neutral as between all qualified persons who come within its ambit. It must
permit pluralism in the politics and life styles of lawyers.4°
The second major feature of community sanction is professional control
over admission to practice, discipline and expulsion. In Canada, this control
is exercised through a system of professional self-government: all lawyers
are statutorily obliged to be members of a provincial association whose gov-
erning body is elected by its members and has power to regulate the
profession. 41
Until recently, the virtue of professional self-government was almost an
article of faith, at least within the profession. We tended to ignore the fact
that self-government is by no means a universal phenomenon. Lawyers in
many American states and in Sweden, to take but two examples, and even
English solicitors, have survived as "professionals" although membership in
their professional organizations is voluntary, and although courts or other
public agencies have power to regulate them.4
Now, however, the concept of public participation in the profession's
government is beginning to take root in Canada. It is the logical corollary
40There is only a single reported instance of the enforcement of political con-
formity involving refusal to admit a Communist to the bar, see Martin v. Law Society
of British Columbia, [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173 (B.C.CA.).
41See e.g. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, ss.10, 15 ff., 50.
42 See generally, Arthurs, supra, note 21 at 2.
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of the proposition that the profession's monopoly and privileges exist to
advance the public interest.
Two styles of public participation appear to be emerging. One is typified
by Ontario. There, the move towards public participation stems less from
overt popular discontent than from recognition by the bar that accountability
to the public is not merely inevitable, but is right in principle as well; this
recognition was, of course, spurred by the McRuer Report.4 3 Because it was
embraced, rather than opposed, by the Law Society, and because the On-
tario bar has been somewhat responsive to its public responsibilities in such
matters as the policing of lawyers' frauds and the provision of legal aid,
public intervention is likely to be maintained at a fairly low level, for the
present at least.44
In 1970, Ontario began its experiment in public participation with the
enactment of a new Law Society Act. In order to introduce a measure of
outside influence into the processes of professional self-government, the
Attorney General, a bencher ex officio of the Law Society, was expressly
designated as "the guardian of the public interest in all matters ... having
to do with the legal profession"; the Law Society's regulations were made
subject to approval by the provincial cabinet and its disciplinary proceedings
were made subject to judicial review; and a new Law Society Council with
some lay representatives was established "to consider the manner in which
[lawyers] are discharging their obligations to members of the public". 45 By
1972, however, the Law Society Council had been discarded as unworkable
(at least in the judgment of its own members and of the Law Society). On
its own initiative, and without visible public pressure, the Law Society has
now invited lay representatives to participate directly in Convocation, its
governing body.46
Quebec represents a contrasting style. Legislation in that province does
seem to reflect popular resentment against the professions, and its reach is
more ambitious. Following the Castonguay Report on Medical Services, 47
Bill 250 was introduced in 1971 bringing al professions under the super-
visory jurisdiction of a provincial agency, while establishing a uniform basic
framework for the governance of individual professions, including law.48 This
legislation evoked a violent reaction from the legal profession, both in Quebec
48Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, vol. 3, at 1166
(1968).
44 Cf. Giffen, "Social Control and Professional Self-Government: A Study of the
Legal Profession in Canada", in Clark (ed.) Urbanism and the Changing Canadian
Society (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1961), and Orkin, supra, note 6, Part m11. dubitante.
4 5 See Arthurs, supra, note 21, for a discussion of these provisions.
4 0 See supra, note 20.
4dQuebec, Commission of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare, see esp. vol. 1
at 131 et seq. (1969).
48Professional Code, Que. Nat'l. Ass'y, 2d sess., 29th Leg., Bill 250 (1971);
Act to Amend the Bar Act, Que. Nat'l. Ass'y, 3d sess., 29th Leg., Bill 251 (reprint,
1972).
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and in other provinces, 49 and the ultimate shape of the new law remains
in doubt.
What is not in doubt is the proposition that there will be a public
presence of some kind within the governing councils of the Canadian legal
profession. The desirability of this presence is hard to quarrel with in prin-
ciple. However, in practice, I am not overly optimistic about the prospects
it offers for the protection of the public interest.
First, laymen would not in fact likely possess the technical knowledge
to make meaningful judgments about the way in which, for example, pro-
fessional incompetence is policed. Secondly, there is the likelihood of co-
optation. Familiarity breeds affection, understanding and ultimately ac-
quiescence. There is a process, which has been observed in other spheres of
public regulation, whereby the regulating agency becomes excessively sym-
pathetic to the regulated industry. Regulation becomes merely symbolic. 0
Thirdly, it is important to remember that the public interest is not one
and indivisible. One group of public interest advocates, the consumer spokes-
men, tend to focus on the price and quality of professional services, and
therefore, favour regulation of the professions by government or other extra-
professional agencies. But there is also a public interest in the dispersal of
social, economic and political power throughout society. Political, social,
economic and cultural pluralism all serve to inhibit centralized power -
whether majoritarian or authoritarian. Independent labour unions, churches,
cooperatives, newspapers, community organizations, universities, consumer
groups, and professions all represent power centres with which governments
must reckon. To the extent that these groups are brought under tighter and
tighter control by government, the potential for rallying opposition to the pre-
vailing political philosophy of the day is diminished. Of course, pluralism is
purchased at a price. Such groups may mount resistance to governments
which are forward-looking, as well as those which are reactionary, to those
which favour a broad spectrum of public interests, as well as those which seek
to protect private and parochial interests. Preserving the independence of the
professions (and other groups) does help to assure the existence of a loyal
opposition. But they cannot have a veto power. In a democracy, if the gov-
ernment has the votes, it must ultimately prevail.
Whatever their ultimate shapes, it must be assumed that these new in-
stitutional arrangements in Ontario and Quebec are harbingers of a more
vigorous public scrutiny of the profession. What are likely to be the main
areas of interest?
49See e.g. Farris, Let's Kill All the Lawyers (1972), 2 C.BJ. (n.s.) 4; Opposition
ferme a l'ingdrence au congr~s du Barreau du Quibec, [Apr., 1972] C.B. Bull. 11;
Jasmin, Vers l'av~nement d'un regime dictatorial .... ., [Apr., 1972] C.B. Bull. 14; Un
enterrement du premiare classe?, [July, 1972] C.B. Bull 17; Int'l Bar Assn. Responds
to Quebec's Bill 250, [July, 1972] C.B. Bull. 16; Robins, The Treasurer Reports (1972),
6 L.S.U.C. Gaz. 1 at 22 if.; B.C. Justice stresses need for independent bench and bar,
[Oct., 1972] C.B. Bull. 13.
50 Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: U. of illinois Press, 1964).
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Surely the problems of the supply of, and demand for, legal services
are first on the agenda.
At the moment, in certain sectors, demand exceeds supply.51 Some
areas - the Maritime provinces generally and rural communities across the
country - support fewer lawyers than they did a generation ago. Within the
large cities, lawyers are located mainly in the downtown core, rather than the
suburbs where the bulk of the population resides. For example, in Metro-
politan Toronto, the five suburban boroughs contain 63% of the population,
but less than 7% of the lawyers, while the city's downtown core has less than
1% of the population and 84% of the lawyers. For most Canadians, then,
lawyers are physically "scarce". More importantly, legal services are beyond
the financial means of large segments of our population. Of all the provinces,
only Ontario has a broad civil and criminal legal aid plan and even Ontario's
plan leaves largely untouched some legal problems commonly encountered
by the poor. 2
In other sectors, however, it is feared that there is a glut of lawyers
on the market. Between 1950 and 1970, the number of persons per lawyer
dropped 38% in Albreta, 23% in British Columbia and 15% in Ontario.
Much more drastic changes are now upon us, at least in Ontario. The pro-
vincial bar numbered about 7,000 in 1970. In that year, some 450 new
recruits began practice. For 1972, the number of new recruits was 520, by
1976 this should rise to 850-900.r, Subject to certain contingencies, the intake
will remain at this level, so that during the 1970's, as many new lawyers will
have entered practice as were already in practice in 1970. By 1980, then, it
seems likely that the Ontario bar will have increased from 7,000 to at least
12,000 or 13,000 - a much greater increase than any projected for the
population at large.
The intake levels are basically determined by the number of persons
entering and graduating from Ontario law schools each year, since there
has been no attempt to restrict the number of LL.B. graduates called to the
bar annually, and since the inter-provincial migration of lawyers is negligible.
Thus, a change in law school population will automatically change the bar's
annual intake. At the moment, Ontario law schools enrol about 1,000 stu-
dents each year from (likely) 3,000-3,500 applicants with basic paper
qualifications. The number enrolled could be greatly enlarged by any (or all)
of three expedients: more intensive use of physical and staff resources; em-
ployment of existing resources at the same level of intensity, but on a shorter
academic programme (say two, rather than three years); or by increasing
51 For a review of the available statistical data, see Arthurs, Willms and Taman,
The Toronto Legal Profession: An Exploratory Survey (1971), 21 U. of T. L.J. 498.
52Report of the Subcommittee on Community Legal Services, supra, note 31.
3 L.S.U.C., Report of the Special Committee on Legal Education, Appendix C
(1972).
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the number of law schools. If this were done, the "glut" on the market
would quickly grow. Would this be sound public policy?
Assuming the reasonable mobility of lawyers, and the operation of a
free pricing mechanism for their services, it might be thought that over-
supply would gradually solve the problem of presently unmet demands. If
there are too many lawyers in downtown areas, more will move to the
suburbs; if there are too many lawyers in cities, more will move to rural
areas; if there are too many lawyers to serve the rich, more will serve the
poor at prices the poor can afford to pay.
However, the assumptions are questionable. The mobility of lawyers is
inhibited by a host of personal and professional considerations: the difficulty
of identifying a new location for practice and establishing a clientele there;
the propensity of clients with important problems to take them to prestigious
"downtown" metropolitan practitioners; the consequent routine nature of
much locally-based practice, and its focus on less complex and less re-
munerative matters. In the result, lawyers are reluctant to move to under-
serviced areas. In terms of service to the poor, the normal pricing mechanisms
are unlikely to produce results. Many people simply cannot afford any fees
at all, no matter how modest. Even for the urban middle class client, there
is little hope for gain in the present "oversupply" situation. Artificial re-
straints, requiring general adherence to established fee traiffs, preclude genuine
competition for work based on price.
Thus, the deliberate creation of a large pool of underemployed lawyers,
in and of itself, is unlikely to produce a solution to the problem of serving
groups presently without legal advice. On the other hand, lawyers express
considerable fear that an oversupply will create conditions of cut-throat
competition for the traditional clientele - leading to fees which are somewhat
lower, profit-margins which are paper-thin, and the consequent deterioration
of the quality of service. This argument seems to be a transparent disguise
for the fear that an oversupply of lawyers will lead to lower professional
incomes. However, it is clear that so long as fees remain subject to a tariff
structure, the major impact of oversupply will not be to decrease fees. The
most likely short-run effects of a large intake into the profession will be,
first, to lower salary scales for young lawyers hired by established firms,
second, to force some of those who cannot find work in established firms to
open up on their own, and third, to drive some new law graduates to seek
the relative security of a position in industry or government, perhaps in a non-
professional capacity.
None of these consequences is intrinsically bad, especially the last. But
should the public not have the advantage of the lower fees which should
theoretically flow from a situation of vigorous competition? The point was
made by the Economic Council of Canada in its Interim Report on Competi-
tion Policy: if the profession is not to be subject to normal market mecha-
nisms, its charges should be regulated by a public body, rather than by lawyer
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groups.54 The new Competition Act is likely to do little in a practical way to
implement this recommendation.r5
And what of the unmet demand for legal services? We stand at the cross-
roads. The Ontario fee-for-service Legal Aid scheme56 marked an enormous
advance in bringing professional services within the financial reach of many
citizens, but it was an expensive advance. The question is whether, to com-
plete the job of making legal services available, the same costly arrangements
should be followed in Ontario or emulated elsewhere. The presently unserv-
iced clientele does differ, in many ways, from that which enjoys the benefit
of the Legal Aid Plan. For example, the types of cases which are presently
excluded from the coverage of the Ontario plan tend to involve a minimal
gain for a maximum expenditure: the protection of a tenant on a month-to-
month tenancy; a claim for welfare benefits; defending against payment of a
small debt; a routine, uncontested divorce.57 But while each of these matters
is fairly trivial in dollar terms, each tends to be highly important in emotional
and personal terms to the individual concerned - and there are a great many
such individuals.
To cope with this large number of small cases, the fee-for-service plan
seems far less efficient than the provision of advice and assistance through
clinics staffed by salaried lawyers. 58
The prospect of a group of salaried lawyers working for the poor also
suggests a solution to the problems of providing service on a broader geo-
graphical base. Salaried lawyers do not need to worry about getting a prac-
tice off the ground, and the presence of a number of them in decentralized
clinics would provide them with collegial supports and possibilities for spe-
cialization which have up to now existed only "downtown".
Finally, the unique advantage of local clinics is that they open up pos-
sibilities for winning the confidence of potential clients. When lawyers are
visible in a community, and provide service in a modest and congenial setting,
there is a much greater likelihood that poor people will overcome their tradi-
tional reluctance to seek legal advice. 59
It is clear, then, that the public is vitally interested in resolving issues
relating to the supply of, and demand for, legal services. It is the public
which stands to lose from any shortfall and gain from any surplus in the
54 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy, at 148 et
seq. (1969).
55 See on this point, Arthurs "The Professions and Competition Policy" in Skeoch(ed.), Proceedings of the Conference on Canadian Competition Policy for the 1970's
(1972) at 50.
SH Legal Aid Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.239.
ST None of these types of cases is necessarily beyond the scope of the Act; exclusion
results from limitations imposed by regulation or administrative decisions reflecting,
in turn, financial pressures on the Plan, see e.g. L.S.U.C., Ontario Legal Aid Plan,
[1971] Annual Report at 7.
5This proposition has been challenged however, see Report of the Subcommittee
on Community Legal Services, supra, note 31.
59 See generally Lowry, A Plea for Clinical Law (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 183.
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number of lawyers. It is the public which pays the basic costs of educating
lawyers and of providing legal services for the poor. It is the public whose
interests will be vindicated to a larger or lesser degree, depending on the
methods devised for delivering legal services. And, finally, the governing
bodies of the bar implicitly concede the public's right to determine issues of
supply and demand; the profession has made no moves (at least in Ontario)
either to bar the door or to encourage recruitment into the profession.60 Re-
solving the issues of supply and demand is thus a perfect example of why
there must be, and will be, public participation in the process of professional
self-government.
As has been suggested, it is by no means clear that such participation
will effectively promote the public interest. But a public presence may trigger
changes in traditional notions of professionalism. It is at least conceivable
that carefully chosen, well-motivated public representatives could raise ques-
tions which would force members of the profession to address issues which
they seldom canvass at the level of first principles.
Finally, there is the question of professional privileges. By way of ex-
ample, consider the traditional solicitor-client privilege which enables a
person to make full disclosure to his lawyer in order to obtain legal advice,
with the assurance that his confidences will be preserved.61 This privilege is
generally accepted, or at least not overtly disputed. But it is premised upon
the existence of an arms-length relationship between lawyer and client which
may have once existed, but does not always exist today. Should the privilege
attach in a relationship in which the lawyer is, in effect, part of the client's
organization, perhaps an essential element in his decision-making process?
Now that lawyers are increasingly involved in planning business policies and
tactics which may violate income tax, competition, or labour relations laws,
it can be argued that they should not be allowed to throw the protective
cloak of privilege around evidence which would otherwise be compellable. To
some extent, for example in the area of income tax, the privilege has already
been diminished.62 We can anticipate still more incursions.
I mention solicitor-client privilege not simply because it is intrinsically
important, but also because it is symptomatic. With the greater range of
activities undertaken by lawyers, there is a corresponding shrinkage in the
area of what is sacrosanct. To render needed service to clients, and to sur-
vive economically, lawyers must undertake new tasks. But they cannot at
the same time continue to assert privileges relevant to other types of pro-
fessional work and other styles of practice.
60 The Wright Report and the Legal Profession (1972), 6 L.S.U.C. Gaz. 79. The
Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.27(3) provides: "No applicant for admission to
the Society who has met all admission requirements shall be refused admission". Cf.
Report of the Special Credentials Committee of the Law Society of British Columbia,
at 8 (1972).
61 See generally Tollefson, "Privileged Communications in Canada" in Proceedings
(1967), 4th Intl. Symp. on Comp. Law, U. of Ottawa, 32.
62 See Freedman, Solicitor-Client Privilege Under the Income Tax Act (1969), 12
C.BJ. 93.
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Another example of professional privilege is the right to act for some-
one towards whom one is at best neutral, and often unsympathetic, to seek
a result for him to which he is not entitled. "How can you defend a self-
confessed criminal?", lawyers are often asked. Of course, we have a variety
of answers: the confession may be false, the product of a disturbed mind or
of a desire to shield the true offender; lawyers work on the "cab rank" prin-
ciple, and must carry any customer who can pay the fare; everyone is en-
titled to the benefit of vigorous advocacy because we determine cases through
the adversary system, in which the truth emerges from the heat of the battle.
If a sophisticated layman might hesitate to accept these explanations,
which lawyers have traditionally advanced, perhaps it is because lawyers
have to be satisfied, while laymen can indulge themselves with the luxury of
honest doubt. For are not lawyers defending this privilege of guilty knowl-
edge not merely against public scepticism, but against their own inability to
live with it? The lawyer, after all, does not cease to be a human being: he
must often be distressed because he finds himself the unwilling servant of
obnoxious interests. Can he continue to win his living on a daily basis by
doing this kind of work, if he cannot dull his reactions, mask his distaste,
and provide a rationalization to himself? 03
The former privilege, non-disclosure, is sanctioned by law, while the
latter, neutrality toward the client, is sanctioned by convention. Both, how-
ever, must stand scrutiny by an increasingly sophisticated and agnostic pub-
lic if they are to survive.
What is needed is more thoughtful articulation of the functional reasons
for such privileges, which alone will justify their continuance. Without such
reasons, professional privileges will come increasingly under attack, and
ultimately give way. The professional will, increasingly, have to give an
accounting to his community and his clients, a social audit of his position,
equivalent to the financial audit now required to avoid the theft of trust funds.
03 This is strongly suggested in the jury address of defence counsel for the assassin
of D'Arcy McGee, see Stark, Barrister-at-Law, Osgoode Hall (1967), 1 L.S.U.C. Gaz.
(no. 3) 15 at 18-19.
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